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ABSTRACT
For the past twenty-ﬁve years, Dusansky and his associated co-authors have published a
longseries of papers which are based on the same price-dependent utility function. The
alleged price dependence, however, is ﬁctitious in the sense that the level of exogenous money
income can replace the commodity prices. The consequence is that the demand functions
derived from Dusansky’s utility function are identical and observationally equivalent to the
demand functions obtained from a prototypical utility function. Since all the market and
environmental eﬀects are revealed only through the demand functions, the speciﬁcation and
use of a utility function such as that used by Dusansky is irrelevant and uninformative for
the analysis of any economic problem where prices enter the consumer utility function and
whose goal is the detection of the eﬀects of price-dependent preferences on the demand for
real goods.
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1A Recurrent Utility Function of Fictitious Generality
For the past twenty ﬁve years, Dusansky and associated co-authors have published a
series of at least eight papers (see Dusansky and Wilson, Dusansky 1989 and 1980, Dusansky
and Kalman 1976, 1974, 1972 together with the “Erratum” of 1973, Kalman, Dusansky and
Wickstr¨ om, and Kalman and Intriligator) which are essentially based on the same price-
dependent utility function. All these papers use a peculiar utility function that, in spite
of its dependence upon all commodity prices, generates demand functions that satisfy the
traditional properties, includingthe symmetry and neg ative semideﬁniteness of the Slutsky
matrix.
We will demonstrate that the recurrent utility function of Dusansky and associated
co-authors is operationally indistinguishable from an archetype utility function dependent
only on real goods, i.e., it is simply an aﬃne transformation of a prototype utility function
dependent only on real goods. Hence, it is well known that two utility functions related in
such a manner are equivalent in the sense that they generate identical demand functions
with identical empirical properties, and thus are observationally indistinguishable. Given
that this fundamental result was established at least a hundred years ago, it is natural to
ask the followingtwo questions:
1. Why is it of interest to seek out the traditional Slutsky matrix and its properties as a ﬁnal
target of any consumer’s utility speciﬁcation, including those that are price-dependent?
2. Why is it not more interestingto expect that the price dependency of the utility function
will likely require a modiﬁcation of the traditional Slutsky matrix and, therefore, provide
results with an eye towards generalization?
There are at least two possible answers to the ﬁrst question. One is to prove observational
equivalence, while another is the desire to derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the
general model that yield the prototype testable implications even though they could be
2delivered by the prototype model. Havingderived a form of the utility function necessary
to attain this objective (see “Erratum” in JET, 1973, p. 107), ﬁve of the aforementioned
papers essentially prove that such a utility function is necessary. In fact, the proofs that
the recurrent price dependent utility function is necessary to recover the prototype Slutsky
properties are identical in Dusansky and Wilson (1993), Dusansky (1989) and Dusansky and
Kalman (1976), and are only slightly more general in Kalman, Dusansky and Wickstr¨ om
(1974) and Kalman and Intriligator (1973) due to the more general model considered.
The answer to the second question has been given over the years by several authors
beginning with Lloyd, Berglas and Razin, and Samuelson and Sato. All these authors have
pointed out the necessity of generalizing the archetype Slutsky matrix when preferences are
price dependent. Furthermore, Clower and Riley, followed by Howitt and Patinkin, have been
critical of Dusansky and co-authors regarding related money illusion claims and have pointed
out the “spurious generality ” of their results. Their conclusions, however, went unheeded
by Dusansky who, after the debate, derived the same price-dependent utility function in two
other papers (Dusansky, 1989 and Dusansky and Wilson 1993).






where p and q are vectors of commodity price and quantities, and K is an arbitrary constant.
We note that in Dusansky and Wilson, f(q,p) is an expected utility function. In the ﬁve
papers referred to above, Dusansky and his co-authors have shown that one can integrate
back to this utility function given demand functions that satisfy the traditional Slutsky
properties.
This statement must be viewed in the context of consumer theory, where all the measur-
able relations are expressed by the consumer demand functions and not by the utility func-
tion. Within this context— which is the only admissible one—the above price-dependent
3utility function is equivalent to the traditional utility function, say π(q), that depends only on
the quantities of consumed commodities, in the sense that f(q,p) and π(q) generate identical
demand functions. Since only demand functions are observable, it is impossible to distin-
guish whether they have been generated by one or the other utility function and, therefore,
claims that f(q,p) is a more general utility function than π(q) are specious.
This conclusion is so obvious that its restatement may appear to be a waste of time and
eﬀort. Unfortunately, as longas Dusansky and his co-authors keep publishingpapers which
claim to oﬀer an insight into the issue pertaining to price-dependent preferences using the
utility function presented in Eq. (1), it will be necessary to keep remindingthe audience
of its ﬁctitious generality and empirical emptiness for modeling price-dependent preferences,
no matter how sophisticated the mathematical presentation may appear.
We demonstrate the ﬁctitious generality of the utility function in Eq. (1) by discussing
the Proposition in Dusansky and Wilson’s paper published in JET in 1993. We follow the
notation in their Eq. (19). Note that we could have equivalently adopted the notation in
Dusansky (1989, Eq. (A11)), or Dusansky and Kalman (1976, Eq. (12)), as the proposition
that all three papers prove is identical, as noted above. Then, the main result of Dusansky
and Wilson (see p. 129) is contained in their
“Proposition. Given symmetry of the Slutsky unobservables, Sij = Sji, a general





where π(·) is any real valued twice continuously diﬀerentiable function, strictly qua-
siconcave and increasing in its arguments, σ(·) is any real valued twice continuously
diﬀerentiable function, and K is any non-negative constant.”
We note that this Proposition gives necessary conditions for a price-dependent utility
function to yield the prototype Slutsky matrix and its properties.
4I. Discussion
We state and prove the followingsuﬃciency counterpart to the above Proposition of
Dusansky and Wilson.
Lemma. If the utility function f(q,p) is speciﬁed as in Eq. (1), then the demand functions
obtained from it have the prototype Slutsky properties.
Proof: We begin the proof by demonstrating the equivalence of three related utility
speciﬁcations, whose correspondingindirect utility functions are deﬁned as
Φ1(p,y) := max
q {π(q)+σ(p)+Kqp | qp = y} (2)
Φ2(p,y) := max
q {π(q)+σ(p)+Ky | qp = y} (3)
Φ3(p,y) := max
q
{π(q) | qp = y}. (4)
By deﬁnition of Φ1(p,y),
Φ1(p,y) = max
q
{π(q)+σ(p)+Kqp | qp = y}
= max
q
{π(q)+σ(p)+Ky | qp = y} for all feasible q
=Φ 2(p,y) by deﬁnition of Φ2(p,y)
= σ(p)+Ky+ max
q
{π(q) | qp = y}
= σ(p)+Ky+Φ 3(p,y) by deﬁnition of Φ3(p,y).
Thus,
Φ1(p,y) ≡ Φ2(p,y) ≡ Φ3(p,y)+σ(p)+Ky. (5)






















Let q1(p,y),q2(p,y) and q3(p,y) be the vectors of demand functions and let λ1(p,y),λ 2(p,y)
and λ2(p,y) be the associated Lagrange multipliers resulting from the solutions of the three


























































Equations (10), (13), and (16) are identical by Eq. (6) and Eq. (7). Since all three demand
functions are identical, they are indistinguishable from the neoclassical prototype q3(p,y) and,
therefore, all have the identical and traditional Slutsky properties. Q.E.D.
6The Proposition and Lemma, therefore, show that the utility function f(q,p) as speci-
ﬁed in Eq. (1), is equivalent to and indistinguishable from a traditional utility function that
depends only on real goods, say π(q), in the sense that the two sets of demand functions ob-
tained from the utility functions f(q,p) and π(q) are identical and thus have indistinguishable
properties. This means that adoptingthe utility function f(q,p) as a basis for investigat-
ingthe eﬀects of price-dependent preferences on commodity demands is of no value since it
cannot yield any insights into such matters.
Another troublingpoint about this literature is the apparently incomplete understanding
of the model by its authors. Take footnote 7 in Dusansky and Wilson (1993, p.131), for
example:
“ It can be shown that the negative semi-deﬁniteness property holds if (λ−K) > 0.
We know that λ>0, by the construction of the Lagrangean, and that K can be
arbitrarily small. Hence, this technical condition is satisﬁed.”
In general, by the construction of the Lagrangean alone, the Lagrange multiplier λ1(p,y)
can be either positive or negative and may also be equal to zero, for the budget constraint
is an equality. From Eqs. (7), (9) and Eq. (15), (λ1(p,y) − K)=λ3(p,y) > 0 by the non-
satiation hypothesis, regardless of the magnitude and sign of the constant K and the sign of
λ1(p,y). This means that K can be arbitrarily large in absolute value without ever violating
the technical condition that (λ1(p,y) − K) > 0. Requiringthat K be arbitrarily small would
render the eﬀect of Kpq insigniﬁcant, contrary to the objective of the authors.
Therefore, the suﬃcient condition (λ−K) > 0 of Dusansky and Wilson is always satisﬁed
under the non-satiation hypothesis. Hence, Proposition 2 and footnote 5 in Dusansky (1989,
p. 898), footnote 5 in Dusansky and Kalman (1976, p. 195), and footnote 7 in Dusansky
and Wilson (1993, p. 131) are irrelevant for the negative semi-deﬁniteness of the Slutsky
matrix.
We note ﬁnally that the utility function f(q,p) of Eq. (1) is a positive aﬃne transformation
7of the function π(q). This is seen by recallingthat, by Lemma, it is suﬃcient to choose
g(p,y): =σ(p)+Ky, where K is an arbitrary constant. Then, f(q,p)=π(q)+g(p,y), and the
Slutsky conditions associated with f(q,p) are identical to those associated with π(q).
II. Conclusion
We have shown that the utility function f(q,p) in Eq. (1) is operationally identical to
and, therefore, indistinguishable from a conventional utility function which depends only on
real goods. The eight papers by Dusansky and his co-authors, therefore, contain a meta-
contradiction, that is, a contradiction involvingtwo conceptual frameworks of analysis. They
intended to model the demand for real goods by formulating a utility function that included
the prices of real goods. They combined this objective with the further requirement that the
resultingmodel reproduce the Slutsky matrix and its properties of the standard consumer
theory. The use of a price-dependent utility function that is necessary and suﬃcient for re-
coveringthe prototype Slutsky matrix and its properties, however, eliminated any possibility
of detectingthe eﬀects of price-dependent preferences on the demand for real g oods. The
meta-contradiction, therefore, consists of wishingto formulate a model that expresses the
eﬀects of price-dependent preferences on demand and, at the same time, requiringthat the
Slutsky conditions of the standard consumer model hold. In other words, since all the market
and environmental eﬀects are revealed only through the demand functions, the speciﬁcation
and use of a utility function such as f(q,p) of Eq. (1) is irrelevant and uninformative for
the analysis of any economic problem where prices enter the consumer utility function and
whose goal is the detection of the eﬀects of price-dependent preferences on the demand for
real goods.
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